The concept of free will relevant to our moral, legal, personal and social practices is much more complex than that captured by Libert's experiments.
Three decades later, neuroscientists have reached the same conclusion as philosophers: free will is complicated.
Libet’s experiments have been criticized, with many arguing that “there was no evidence of stronger electrophysiological signs before a decision to move than before a decision not to move, so these signs clearly are not specific to movement preparation.”
Recent studies also point to a different interpretation of the RP, namely that the apparent build-up of the brain activity preceding subjectively spontaneous voluntary movements may reflect the ebb and flow of the background neuronal noise, which is triggered by many factors.
These subsequent studies argued that Libert’s was a flawed interpretation, and that the results said little about free will.
This interpretation seems to bridge, at least partially, the gap between the neuroscientific perspective on free will and the intuitive, commonsensical view of it.